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Peacekeeping in Name Alone:
Accountability for the United Nations
in Haiti
By MATT HALLING AND BLAINE BOOKEY*

I. Introduction
The period from February 29, 2004 - the day democratically
elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was forced to leave his
country - to the present has marked a dark period for Haiti.'

Thousands of men, women, and children have been murdered, raped,
and unlawfully detained. Peacekeeping forces of the United Nations

Stabilization Mission in Haiti ("MINUSTAH"), sent to Haiti in an
effort to reinstall democracy, are directly responsible for scores of
these human rights violations.
Since its authorization in April 2004, MINUSTAH forces,

operating primarily under Brazilian command, have engaged in a
systematic pattern of attacks resulting in the deaths and injuries of
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innocent civilians residing in the capital's poorest slums.
Peacekeepers have also raped Haitian women. Moreover, through
joint operations and willful blindness, MINUSTAH's actions (and
inactions) have assisted efforts of the Haitian National Police under
the Interim Government of Haiti, when it was in effect, to quell
political dissent.
This report attempts to demonstrate the magnitude of human
rights abuses that have occurred and continue to occur in Haiti at the
hands of U.N. peacekeeping forces in addition to discussing potential
mechanisms for accountability and making recommendations to the
United Nations.
Section II of the report provides a background of abuses
committed by MINUSTAH. This section provides an analysis of
MINUSTAH's actions to show that the actions taken by the
peacekeeping forces (1) clearly violate their own official mandate,
and (2) rise to the level of violations of international law.
Section III of the report analyzes potential mechanisms for
accountability for the United Nations and MINUSTAH's largest
troop-contributing country, Brazil, through the lens of a private right
of action. Four legal options are explored: (1) suit in Brazil, (2) suit
in Haiti, (3) suit in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and
(4) direct suit against the United Nations. This section also assesses
the feasibility of each option to achieve justice for Haitian victims of
MINUSTAH violence. Suit in the International Criminal Court
("ICC") is not explored as the ICC does not appear to be a viable
mechanism for accountability at this point.2 The ICC is a court of last
resort and currently has a limited docket.3 Well over 1,000 complaints
have been filed in the ICC, but only four have been opened for
investigation.4 Because this report focuses solely on private rights of
action, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") is excluded as its
jurisdiction is limited to actions brought by nation states.5
In conclusion, Section IV of this report makes recommendations
2. See Alexandra Harrington, Victims of Peace: Current Abuse Allegations
Against UN. Peacekeepers and the Role of Law in Preventing Them in the Future,
12 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 125,141-42 (2005).
3. International
Criminal
Court, About the Court, http://www.icccpi.int/about.html.
4. International Criminal Court, Situations and Cases, http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTPUpdateonCommU.N.ications_10_February_2006.pdf.
5. Annex to U.N. Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26,
1945, arts. 36 and 37.
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to the U.N. regarding the creation of a more binding mechanism of
This section is especially
accountability for its peacekeepers.
pertinent given the extension of MINUSTAH's mandate until
October 15, 2008, the rise in peacekeeping operations over the last
decade, as well as the wholly inadequate accountability mechanisms
so far employed by the United Nations. One striking example is
peacekeepers, guilty of raping young women in the Congo, were
simply repatriated.6 It goes without saying that repatriation provided
neither redress for victims nor true accountability for the U.N.
soldiers.
II. MINUSTAH Mandate and the Failure to Live Up to It
United Nations' peacekeeping forces, also known as "Blue
Helmets," have been present in Haiti from 2004 to the present. After
the overthrow of twice elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide on
February 29, 2004, the President of the Interim Government of Haiti
("IGH"), Boniface Alexandre, requested assistance from the United
This request authorized international troops, the
Nations.
Multinational Interim Force ("MIF"), to enter Haiti.8 Thereafter, on
April 30, 2004, the United Nations Security Council established the
U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti ("MINUSTAH"), transferring
authority soon after in June. 9 The U.N. mission has been marred
since its inception: It is the only peacekeeping force deployed without
a formal peace agreement. '° In lieu of enforcing a peace agreement,
the mission of U.N. forces has instead been to consolidate the coup
d'etat1 As is discussed in detail below, MINUSTAH has launched
the overwhelming number of its operations in neighborhoods where
large numbers of residents support the Fanmi Lavalas political party

6. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Urges Stronger MeasuresAgainst Sex Abuse
by U.N.Peacekeepers, July 27, 2005, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives
(follow "washfile-english" hyperlink; then follow "2005" hyperlink; then follow
"July" hyperlink).
7. Haiti - MINUSTAH - Background, [hereinafter Background], available at
<http://www.U.N..org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustahlbackgroU.N.d.html>.
8. S.C. Res. 1529, 2, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1529 (Feb. 29, 2004).
9. S.C. Res. 1542, I11-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1542 (April 30, 2004).
10. Concannon, Brian and Joseph, Mario, Haiti, MINUSTAH, and Latin
America: Solidaridad?,Americas Program, Center for International Policy Special
Report, April 9, 2007, available at http://americas.irc-online.org/am/4140 [hereinafter
Concannon].
11. Id.
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and the return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 2
On February 7, 2006, Ren6 Prdval was elected President of Haiti,
marking the country's return to constitutional rule." Since that time,
the Haitian National Police ("HNP") have stopped murderous raids
upon innocent civilians. However, according to a recent report
released by the Center for International Policy, "[MINUSTAH,]
under pressure from the Bush administration and Haitian elites to
take a 'hard line' against the poor neighborhoods, keeps shooting.""
A. Alleged Human Rights Abuses Committed by MINUSTAH
Soldiers
i. Large-Scale OperationsConductedby MINUSTAH
MINUSTAH has conducted several large-scale operations in
poor neighborhoods known as hotbeds for supporters of President
Aristide. Although additional operations have been conducted, the
two discussed here are some of the largest in magnitude. Additional
operations will be discussed below and more information is available
upon request.
On July 6, 2005, MINUSTAH forces led a full-fledged military
attack in Cit6 Soleil. 5 The target of the attack was alleged gang
leader, Dread Wilme, who was killed during the operation along with
an "unspecified number of his associates."' 6 A MINUSTAH "after
action report" states that U.N. soldiers expended 22,000 rounds of
ammunition over the course of seven hours. 7 MINUSTAH has
acknowledged the inevitable "risk of civilian casualties" and
"unintended targets," given the (1) "flimsy construction of homes in

12. See infraSection A.1.
13. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook - Haiti, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html.
14. See Concannon, supra note 10.
15. Center for the Study of Human Rights University of Miami School of Law,
Hait? Human Rights Investigation, March 11-16, 2006," at 11, available at
<http//www.law.miami.edu/cshr/CSHR Report_0311-162006.pdf>
[hereinafter
Miami 2006].
16. Cable from US Embassy Port au Prince re "Haiti: Dread Wilme Killed; HNP
More Active," to U.S. State Department Headquarters, (July 6, 2005), available at
<http://www.cod.edu/people/faculty/yearmancite-soleil.htm>.
17. Cable from U.S. Embassy Port au Prince re "Human Rights Groups Dispute
Civilian Casualty Numbers from July 6 MINUSTAH Raid" to U.S. State Department
Headquarters, (July 26, 2005), available at <http://www.cod.edu/people/faculty/
yearman/cite soleil/Port-auPrince_001919_26July2005.pdf>.
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Cite Soleil," (2) "large quantity of ammunition expended," and (3)
"nature of such missions in dense populated urban areas. 1 8 The
death toll has been estimated at "close to 30. ' 9 Further, Doctors
Without Borders operating at a nearby hospital, reported treating "26
gunshot victims from Citd Soleil
on July 6, of whom 20 were women
20
and at least one was a child.,
On December 22, 2006, MINUSTAH launched another largescale attack on the residents of Cit6 Soleil. 2' Again, there were
hundreds of peacekeepers present, including aerial support, and the
goal of the attack was to apprehend gang members.2 Further, the
Red Cross coordinator said, "U.N. soldiers prevented Red Cross2
vehicles from entering the zone to assist wounded children."
According to a U.N. Security Council report, at least nine civilians
were killed.24 However, independent sources estimate that "more
than 20 people [were] killed and more than 40 individuals were
reported injured."25 Some estimates are as high as 70 people killed. 6
ii. AdditionalHuman Rights Violations Perpetratedby
MINUSTAH
In addition to large-scale operations carried out in the capital's
slums, MINUSTAH soldiers have conducted several smaller-scale
raids as well as incidents of murder, unlawful detention, and rape.
Several incidents will be discussed in chronological order starting
from the most recent. Again, the following is not intended to provide

18. Id.
19. Id. See also International Tribunal on Haiti, Preliminary Report of the
Commission of Inquiry, First Inquiry October 6-11, 2005 (2006), 6-8,
<http://www.ijdh.org/article-international-tribU.N.al.htm>.
[hereinafter
COIR
Report](reporting alleged human rights abuses perpetrated by U.N. and de facto
government forces, listing names of specific victims of the July 6th massacre).
20. Cable from U.S. Embassy, supranote 17.
21. WOMEN'S INT'L LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
IN HAITI (2007), available at http://www.ijdh.org/pdf/headline6-4-07.pdf [hereinafter
"Women's League"] (submitted to the U.N. Human Rights Council May 31, 2007).
22. Id.
23. RAUL ZIBECHI, REPRESSION IN HAITI: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LEFT,
International Relations Center (2007), availableat http://www.ijdh.org/pdf/headline330-07.pdf?sid=06/08/31/144239.
24. Security
Council
Report,
,February.
2007
Haiti,
<http://www.securitycoU.N.cilreport.orgsite/c.glKWLeMTIsGlb.2461273k.472/Febr
uary_2007brHaiti.htm>.
25. Women's League, supranote 21.
26. Zibechi, supranote 23.
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an exhaustive list of alleged human rights violations; additional
information can be provided by the authors upon request.
On February 1, 2007, during a raid in Cit6 Soleil, U.N. soldiers
engaged in indiscriminate shooting, resulting in the deaths of
Stephanie Lubin, seven, and Alexandra Lubin, four. 7 Moreover,
during the incident, the soldiers shot and wounded the children's
parents. 28
On January 25, 2007, MINUSTAH again led an operation in Citd
Soleil. 29 The United Nations claims that the operation was "to take
over a house near an important road controlled by the gangs that also
At least five
served as a base for attacks against U.N. forces."'
people were killed, including one woman who suffered a bullet
3
wound from the attack and died in a nearby hospital hours later.
32
operation.
the
during
wounded
Moreover, at least six people were
On January 20, 2007, U.N. soldiers shot and killed Berhens
Germain, nine.33 The soldiers shot Berhens in the head in the
morning as he sat on the ledge of the family's roof in Cit6 Soleil
playing with a pink toy phone?' MINUSTAH soldiers attempted to
justify the shooting by claiming that the boy was "holding a gun."35
The family cannot afford a burial for the child.36
On June 29, 2005, MINUSTAH forces raided Bel-Air, a slum
located in the capital.37 During the raid, U.N. soldiers entered a
residential courtyard and shot William St. Mercy - "a middle-aged
invalid, who was sitting, unarmed, in his wheelchair" - in the head,

27. Haiti Information Project, UN terrorkills Haiti's children at night, Feb. 2,
2007, http://haitiaction.net/NewsHIP?227/22_7.html.
28. Id.
29. Clashes in Haitileave at least five dead and twelve wounded, Agence France
available at <http://www.wehaitians.com/
Presse,
,
Jan.
26,
2007,
january%202007%20supplement%20news%20and%20analysis%20this%20month.ht
ml>.
30. Id
31. Id
32. Id
33. Sandra Jordan, Haiti's children die in U.N. crossfire, The Observer, Apr. 1,
2007, available at<http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/O,,2047451,00.html>.
34. Id
35. Id
36. Id
37. See Petition filed by Lionel Jean-Baptiste, Esq. et al. before the InterHuman Rights
,
12-13,
available at
American
Commission
on
<http://www.ijdh.org. /BrazilPetition.pdf> [hereinafter IACHR Petition].

20081

Peacekeeping in Name Alone

"blowing off the top half of his skull. 3 8 MINUSTAH was not under
attack when conducting the raid.3 9
On April 9, 2005, MINUSTAH soldiers shot Fedja Raphel, 16,
from an armored vehicle "in broad daylight."'
In February 2005, three U.N. soldiers were accused of raping a 23
year-old woman in the city of Gonaives.
The United Nations
allegedly conducted an investigation in this case and cleared the
soldiers of the charges.
On November 18, 2004, a MINUSTAH soldier shot Hercules
LeFevre, 42, "through the shoulder" with a "high-powered rifle" as
he walked to work.43
On October 22, 2004, MINUSTAH forces conducted a raid in
Martissant, a slum located in Port-au-Prince." During the raid, U.N.
soldiers, from within armored vehicles, shot indiscriminately "all over
the place, especially in the school. 45 As Carlo Pierre, 26, "was about
to throw a rock, a machine gun. affixed to one of the U.N. tanks shot
him in "the stomach, the chest and near the mouth[,]" resulting in his
death.46
In 2004, a MINUSTAH soldier raped a 16-year-old girl.47
ii. Human Rights Abuses Assisted by MINUSTAH
In addition to direct perpetration of human rights abuses against
civilians, MINUSTAH forces have stood by as members of the HNP
carried out mass killings of Haitian civilians. Several instances where
U.N. soldiers have tacitly consented to the HNP's reign of terror

38. Id. at 13.
39. Id.
40. Miami 2006, supra note 15, at 16.
41. Harvard Law Student Advocates for Human Rights & Centro de Justica
Global, Keeping the Peace in Haiti? An Assessment of the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti Using Compliance with its PrescribedMandate as a
Barometer for Success, Mar. 25, 2005 available at <http://www.ijdh.org/
Haiti(English)(Final).pdf> [hereinafter Harvard Report].
42. Id.
43. Griffin, Thomas M., Esq., Haiti Human Rights Investigation: Nov. 11-21,
2004, Center for the Study of Human Rights University of Miami School of Law, 34
[hereinafter Miami 2004].
44. Harvard Report, supranote 41, at 27.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Mike Williams, Fears over Haiti child 'abuse,' BBC News, Nov. 30, 2006,
availableat <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6159923.stm>.
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against the poor will be addressed below; however, it is worth
repeating, this list is not exhaustive.
On August 20, 2005, the HNP, along with gang members,
attacked spectators at a USAID-sponsored soccer match in the
Martissant slum.48 Over the stadium loudspeaker, the police "ordered
everyone in the field to lie down."49 Several people who attempted to

flee were gunned down both inside and outside the stadium, and
others were "hacked to death" with machetes."0
Although
MINUSTAH soldiers "were stationed nearby the stadium," they "did
not intervene to investigate the shootings and commotion. '' "5
On February 28, 2005, while MINUSTAH was patrolling a
Lavalas demonstration in Port-au-Prince, the HNP "killed three
demonstrators and took two bodies away in an ambulance," leaving
the body of52Stanley Bulot on the ground with his "head blown open
by gunfire.,
On November 28, 2004, a member of the police shot Robin
Emmanuel, 32, in the torso.53 At the time of the shooting,
MINUSTAH officers were present with the HNP 4
On November 18, 2004, while attending a pro-Aristide
demonstration in Bel-Air, HNP shot Delage Mesnel, 26, in the arm
and upper torso. 5 MINUSTAH soldiers were present, yet did
nothing to intervene. 6
On November 10, 2004, HNP members shot and killed seven
people and arrested another 180 people in Bel-Air at a demonstration
calling for Aristide's return to Haiti, despite alleged security provided
by MINUSTAH.57
Of those arrested, "five to eight of the
disappeared" were discovered "at the mass burial site in Titanyen"
and three were discovered "at the general morgue of Port-au-

48. Miami 2006, supra note 15, at 17.
49. IACHR Petition, supra note 37, at 117.
50. Tom Luce, 5000 soccerfans in Haiti witness machete and hatchetmassacreby
police and new death squads, Haiti Information Project, Aug. 26, 2005,
<http://www.haitiaction.net/NewsfrL/8265/8_26_5.html>.
51. IACHR Petition, supra note 37 at 17.
52. Id at T9.
53. Harvard Report, supranote 41, at 40.
54. Id
55. Id. at 32.
56. Id
57. Id
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Prince.,,58
On October 24, 2004, members of the HNP shot and wounded
two teenagers, Gorda Guerrier and Guy Wilson.5 9 The teens
underwent operations, and as a result of MINUSTAH's failure to
secure hospitals against the danger of violent and "fatal intrusion,"
within days the HNP entered the hospital and killed them both.'
On October 6, 2004, "MINUSTAH and the HNP conducted one
of their first joint operations in Bel-Air, wherein they swept the area
and carried out "warrantless arrests and house searches." 61 Gerald
Benjamin, 28, was among those arrested. He remained in police
custody for more than three months, under which he endured torture
and beatings.62
B. MINUSTAH's Actions Violate the UN. Mandate and
Principles of International Law
As outlined in the official MINUSTAH mandate, the United
Nations deployed peacekeeping forces to Haiti to (1) ensure a
"secure and stable environment," (2) assist in "monitoring,
restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police, consistent
with democratic policing standards, and (3) support efforts to
promote and protect human rights, particularly of women and
children. ' '63 The mandate also creates the duty to "to monitor and
report on the human rights situation, in cooperation with the Office
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights." '
Initially,
MINUSTAH's mandate was for a period of six months.65 It has been
extended on several occasions.66 On February 15, 2007, the United
Nations. extended
MINUSTAH's
mandate,
calling
upon
peacekeeping forces to recognize "that respect for human rights, due
process and addressing the issue of criminality and credible,
competent, and transparent governance are essential to ensuring

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id
Id. at 30.
Id.at 30-31.
Id. at 39.
Id.
S.C. Res. 1542, supra note 9 at I (III)(a).
Id.
See Background, supra note 7.
Id.
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security in Haiti."67 Moreover, the extended mandate emphasized
"that a combination of measures are necessary to effectively disarm,
demobilize, and reintegrate gang members[.]"" Most recently, on
October 15, 2007, the U.N. extended MINUSTAH's mandate for one
year with the prospect of further renewal.6 9
In addition to the official U.N. mandate, in July 2004 the Haitian
authorities and the U.N. Secretary General signed the requisite Status
of Forces Agreement ("SOFA"). 7 The SOFA outlines the basic
practical concerns of the peacekeeping operation in Haiti (e.g.,
communications, supply provisions, etc.) 7' The SOFA also discusses
the general principles for MINUSTAH soldiers to follow: For
example, they must respect the laws of the country as well as the
principles announced in international conventions. 72 Further, the
SOFA outlines the jurisdiction and accountability mechanisms for
human rights violations. 7 These specific provisions are explored
more deeply in Section III.
MINUSTAH's actions, and lack thereof, undoubtedly violate the
terms of their official mandate and the SOFA. The volume and
severity of the abuses committed by U.N. soldiers shows a lack of
effort on the part of MINUSTAH to protect human rights in Haiti
and uphold standards of international law. On several occasions
MINUSTAH has led operations in Cit6 Soleil and other poor,
densely populated slums located in Port-au-Prince. As evidenced,
dozens of innocent civilians, including women and children, have
been murdered or wounded and severe property damage has been
exacted as a result of the indiscriminate and voluminous rounds of
ammunition dispensed by MINUSTAH.
Peacekeeping forces have failed to monitor and report on human
rights violations as they were called upon to do. They have done the
opposite. For example, after the July 6, 2005, raid, investigators "did
not receive any report of human rights violations that occurred during

67. S.C. Res. 1743, U.N. Doc S/RES/1743 (Feb. 15,2007).
68. Id.
69. S.C. Res. 9141, U.N. Doc. SC/9141 (Oct. 15, 2007).
70. Accord Entre L'Organisation Des Nations Unies Et Le Gouvernement
Haitien ConcernantLe Statut De L 'Op~rationDes Nations Unies en Haiti[Status of
Forces Agreement], 51(b), (July 2004) [hereinafter SOFA].
71. Id. at [j10,20.
72. Id. at $$5,6(b).
73. Id. at 51(b), 52(b), 55.
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the massacre until January 2006." ' This suggests a U.N. cover-up."
The SOFA mandate provides that a standing claims commission be
created to hear private law claims that may arise.76 No such

commission has been created.

7

Instead, in light of preliminary

findings, the United Nations created a disciplinary commission of
inquiry to investigate alleged abuses of peacekeeping forces
perpetrated in October 2005, which suggests that MINUSTAH did in
fact use excessive force and inappropriate body searches.78 However,
the persistence of human rights violations demonstrates that the
commission's efficacy has been minimal and that it has not led to any

changes in the behavior of U.N. soldiers.
MINUSTAH has also been charged with disarming,
demobilizing, and reintegrating gang members. However, it can
hardly be said that MINUSTAH is implementing proportioned
measures to meet this directive when it has primarily engaged in
murderous raids in civilian neighborhoods. While it is true that
several alleged gang leaders and members have been removed from
society by U.N. bullets, it remains unclear why MINUSTAH has
determined that these civilians should not and cannot be afforded
justice and requisite due process under the law.
In addition to violating their own official mandate,
MINUSTAH's actions rise to the level of violations of international

law in contravention of the SOFA.
Crimes of murder (or
extrajudicial killing),79 rape,' and arbitrary arrest,"1 for example, are
74. Miami 2006, supranote 10, at 12.
75. Id.
76. SOFA, supranote 70, at 55.
77. See id.
78. Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, Haiti: UN.sets up panel to
probe report that peacekeepers used excessive force, Dec. 9, 2005,
http://www.ijdh.org/U.N.inhaiti.htm; see also Communique, (U. N.! Stabilization
Mission in Haiti, Port-au-Prince, Haiti), Dec. 8 2005, available at,
http://www.minustah.org/compress/comml3-l.pdf.
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (3)(a) [hereinafter Alien Tort Statute] (the term
extrajudicial killing has been defined as "a deliberated killing not authorized by a
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples").
80. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/48/104, art. 2 (Dec. 20, 1993).
81. See U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9, cl.
1 ("Everyone has
the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law); Universal
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Universally recognized as violations of international law. The
widespread and systematic nature of MINUSTAH's actions
perpetrated against civilians in Haiti, which have led to the deaths,
severe injury, warrantless detention, and persecution of hundreds of
persons known for their political support of ousted President Aristide

bears alarmingly resemblance with the definition of crimes against
humanity stated in the Rome Statute.8'
The human rights violations committed by MINUSTAH soldiers,

all the while bearing the flag of the United Nations, shock the
conscience. Criminal sanctions, in addition to civil sanctions, would
provide a more holistic form of accountability and punishment. As
emphasized in a recent U.N. Commission on Human Rights report,
"Where individuals engage in conduct of a criminal character, they
ought to be subject to criminal proceedings." 83 However, as of now,

private causes of action provide a more immediate and feasible
mechanism for providing redress for victims and fostering a climate of
accountability. This report now turns to an analysis of available
mechanisms in the hopes of adding to efforts to provide justice for
past atrocities as well as to prevent reoccurrence in the future.
III. Potential Mechanisms for U.N. Accountability
The available mechanisms for an individual getting a legal
remedy for MINUSTAH abuses are: (1) to sue in Brazil (which is
MINUSTAH's largest troop contributing country and, the home of
the operation's top commanders, thereby the largest foreign state
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 9.
82. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, sec. 1, July 17
1998, U.N.T.S.90 [hereinafter "Rome Statute"] (a crime against humanity has been
defined as "any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack: (a) Murder; . . . (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g)
Rape...; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political...
or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international
law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; ...[and] (k) Other
inhumane acts of similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health").
83. UN Econ. & Soc. Council [ESCOR], Comm'n on Human Rights, SubComm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Working Paper:
Administration of Justice, Rule of Law and Democracy, 1 11, UN Doc.
E/CN4/Sub.22005/42 (July 7, 2005) (preparedby Fran!oiseHampson) [hereinafter
Hampson].
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action in this scenario); (2) to sue in Haiti; (3) to sue at the InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights (IACHR); or (4) to attempt
to sue the United Nations directly, either in a third party national
court or through a U.N. claims commission. These options need not
be mutually exclusive.
A. Liability,Defendants and Remedies Against Brazil
An argument for Brazil's liability for abuses committed by a
largely Brazilian-commanded MINUSTAH is consistent with the
most recent draft of the International Law Commission on
Responsibilityof InternationalOrganizations." Draft Article 28 says
that a member state of an international organization incurs
responsibility when "it avoids compliance with an international
obligation" and, that this provision applies "whether or not the act in
question is internationally wrongful for the international
organization." 85 Although this provision is still in draft form, this
language casts a broad net around what may constitute legal
responsibility for a member of an international organization. There is
conflicting authority in international courts as to whether member
states are generally liable for international organization abuses. 6
However, recent opinions critical of this kind of liability, have
acknowledged an exception for abuses committed by military
contingents in U.N. peacekeeping operations (See Part B Below).
Recklessness by state actors in international operations has been
found to give rise to liability and responsibility in international courts
as was seen, for example, in the Oneryildiz v. Turkey case tried
recently before the European Court of Human RightsY The ICJ has

84. U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, art.
28, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (Aug. 11, 2006).
85. Id. at 251 n. 537.
86. See Behrami v. France 45 E.Ct. H.R. 41 (2007) (holding that a failure to
remove mines in Kosovo, in violation of the peacekeeping mandate, could only be
attributable to the United Nations and not the European troop contributing states)
In Behrami, the Court cited with approval the International Law Commission's
exception to this rule, which provides that a state contributing military contingents to
a U.N. peacekeeping mission is still liable for troop abuses. Id.at 931. Obviously,
this exception is the case with Brazil and MINUSTAH.
For another case
acknowledging state responsibility within an international organization, see
Bosphorus Hava v. Ireland 42 E.H.R.R. 1 ( 152-3) (2006).
87. Oneryildiz v. Turkey 41 E.Ct H.R. 20 (2005) (holding that a direct causal link
between a fatal methane explosion and the contributory negligence of the
government authorities).
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commented that, in meeting evidentiary burdens of proving criminal
acts by state actors, the victims "should be allowed a more liberal
recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence."
This
"indirect evidence is admitted in all systems of law, and its use is
recognized by international decisions."8 9 Such broad language is
favorable to a Haitian plaintiff in being able to establish Brazil's
recklessness within MINUSTAH.
Individual soldiers and officers could be held liable for particular
abuses, but the abuses reported in Haiti often do not have the
requisite specificity to name individual defendants. Furthermore,
with respect to imposing civil penalties, it is unlikely that individual
U.N. soldiers will have enough money to pay for the judgment. For
these reasons, the troop-contributing state is a superior defendant for
a Haitian plaintiff to sue. Responsibility is easier to establish in the
case of a troop-contributing state than it is in the case of the United
Nations because jurisdiction over peacekeeping abuses is explicitly
granted by the Haitian SOFA (the SOFA is further detailed in Part

C).9°

It is important to recognize that the remedies sought should fit
the crime. As discussed in Section III, the allegations of U.N. and
Brazilian abuses in Haiti easily rise to the level of criminal violations,
but it is practically impossible in the present legal climate to obtain
criminal remedies without the troop-contributing state prosecuting its
own soldiers. Civil remedies for Haitian victims, though sub-optimal
in terms of justice, present a more realistic option. The unacceptable
solution is leaving Haitian victims with no remedy at all, this is
especially true given that civilians are suffering within a peacekeeping
operation intended to better their lives.
B. The United Nations and Brazil May Both Be Liable for
MINUSTAH's Human Rights A buses
State liability for abuses by peacekeeping troop contingents is
fairly non-controversial, but a further issue arises: is the U.N.
concurrently liable for the abuses committed by a peacekeeping
contingent? Not only does the United Nations have immunity from
88. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1993 I.C.J. 325,444 (Sept. 13) (separate
opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
89. Id.
90. SOFA, supra note 69.
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suit that extends beyond that of an individual state, but also there are
understandable concerns for the fairness of holding the whole United
Nations responsible for the actions of one of its members. However,
the U.N.'s connection with MINUSTAH is so intimate that this
situation may be one where concurrent liability should arise.
Concurrent liability makes sense for several reasons. First, the
U.N. legal counsel recently admitted that "an act of a peacekeeping
force is, in principle, imputable to the Organization, and if committed
in violation of an international obligation entails the international
responsibility of the Organization and its liability in compensation."'"
Second, the Status of Forces' domestic immunity for the United
Nations does not protect against all liability because, as Loyola
Professor Jaume Saura stated, issues such as MINUSTAH's human
rights abuse is "an international dispute between international
subjects to which the United Nations is not at all immune."' Third,
the U.N. General Assembly Resolutions on matters giving rise to
U.N. liability and on remedial limits, would be largely moot if the
United Nations had no peacekeeping liability.9
Even official U.N. commissions recognize the possibility of
concurrent liability. The International Law Commission's Special
Rapporteur has recognized that "one could envisage cases in which
conduct should be simultaneously attributed to an international
organization and one or more of its members." 94 Furthermore, the
Special Rapporteur's "paradigmatic example" of where a dual stateorganization attribution could be warranted was the 1999 NATO
bombing in Yugoslavia which culminated in the Bankovic case. 9

MINUSTAH is an analogous situation: it is a military contingent of

91. Giorgio Gaja, Second Report on Responsibility of International
Organizations, 36, delivered to the UN.Intl Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/541
(Apr. 2, 2004) (citing Letter from Hans Corell, U.N. Legal Counsel, to Vclav
Mikulka, Dir. of the Codification Div. (Feb. 3, 2004)).
92. Jaume Saura, Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability of International
HumanitarianLaw to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,58 HASTINGS L.J.

479, 523 (2007).
93. See discussion infra Section E.
94. Gaja, supra note 91, at 7.
95. The fact that the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") in Bankovic
v. United Kingdom denied jurisdiction against NATO does not impact this
concurrent liability analysis. The Court specifically withheld examination on
"alleged several liability of the respondent States for an act carried out by an
international organization of which they are members." See Bankovic v. United
Kingdom, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. SE5, 92 (2001).
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member states acting within an international organization where each
member state is mandated to be individually responsible for the
actions of its troops. The Commission also recognized that "dual
attribution of conduct normally leads to joint, or joint and several,
responsibility."'
C. Domestic Venues for Suit: Brazil and Haiti
As mentioned in Section II, the SOFA outlines the venue
options for a suit against MINUSTAH. Members of the military
component of a United Nations peacekeeping operation shall be
subject to the "exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating
states in respect of any criminal offenses which may be committed by
them" in the host country."' Civil proceedings may be instituted
against members of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in
any court in the host country, but this option is limited by a
certification provision. Before a civil proceeding can continue in the
host country's court, the commander of the mission has to certify
whether the proceeding is related to the official duties of the U.N.
troops.98 If the commander certifies that the troops were acting within
their official duties, then the suit is not allowed to proceed. 99 The
SOFA does mandate a standing claims commission provision, but
none has been created as of September, 2007.'oo
Ironically, the country where the abuses are occurring is possibly
the most difficult forum to choose for litigation among the available
venue options. The SOFA will only allow for a civil action to proceed
in Haiti with the commander's approval, and the U.N. commander
has not yet conceded that any of the recent killings fall outside
MINUSTAH's "official duties." Apparently, deadly attacks, like the
one that killed William St. Mercy in his wheelchair, are not rogue
activities, but rather planned, official operations.
The U.N.
Commission of Human Rights puts so little faith in the likelihood of
this certification that they describe bringing suit against peacekeeper
military contingents in the host state as falling under "absolute
immunity..... Furthermore, the Haitian legal system is unstable as it

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Gaja, supra note 91, at 8.
SOFA, supranote 70 at 51.
Id.at $52(b).
Id.
Id.at 55. See also infraPart E.2, for additional analysis.
Hampson, supra note 83, at Table 1.
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is, and the added restrictions to litigate under SOFA make a suit in
Haiti practically impossible.
Since Brazil is the country that has contributed most of
MINUSTAH's top commanders and the largest troop contingent, the
SOFA allows for a suit in Brazil to proceed regarding human rights
abuses in Haiti. Title III of the Brazilian Military Code allows for a
soldier to be charged with qualified homicide when the crime is
committed "for a futile motive" (i.e., no military necessity).1" The
Brazilian military's disproportionate and ineffective response to the
situation in Cite Soleil could easily qualify under the statute. The
punishment for violating the statute carries a minimum twenty-year
sentence, so a successful prosecution would offer significant
punishment for human rights abusers. Because this option involves
criminal prosecution, the State of Brazil would have to initiate the
proceedings. There is no indication as of this writing that Brazil is
willing to take such legal action. However, this climate could change
with pressure from human rights and other groups working in that
country.
A foreign plaintiff can bring suit in Brazil for a wrongful death
action. Brazil's Code of Civil Procedure states that the Brazilian
judiciary is competent when the defendant, regardless of his/her
nationality, is domiciled in Brazil. 0 3 Brazil's soldiers are presumably
domiciled in Brazil, so a wrongful death action, to pick an example,
could be brought by a Haitian plaintiff. Furthermore, there is also
some established precedent in Europe for bringing successful civil
claims of this type against a sending state's peacekeepers in their own
courts. In a parallel case, Bici v. Ministry of Defence, a British high
court found that the Ministry of Defense was financially responsible
for the deaths of two people by British soldiers operating with the
U.N. peacekeeping mission in Kosovo." This case can be referenced
by analogy in seeking redress for Brazilian peacekeepers' actions in
Haiti.
Nevertheless, Brazil has several disadvantages as a forum for
102. See CODIGO PENAL MILITAR, [C.P.M.], vol. 1, tit. IV, ch. I art. 205 (2)(1)
(Braz.). Many thanks to U.C. Hastings College of the Law student Joana Castro for
Portuguese translations.
103. See CODIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.], vol. 1, tit. IV, ch. II, art. 88(I)
(Braz.).
104. Bici v. Ministry of Def., EWHC 786 (Q.B. 2004). Interestingly, Britain
conceded that it was "vicariously liable" for the wrongs committed by its soldiers on
the U.N. mission. See id at T 2.
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suit. Haitian victims are not able to bring a criminal action on their
own behalf. A civil action in a distant and possibly hostile forum
would be difficult for a Haitian plaintiff to litigate. Lastly, it is worth
noting that Cite Soleil, the target of many of the deadliest
MINUSTAH raids, is a very poor neighborhood consisting of people
who have the least means to access a Brazilian court.
D. Regional Venues for Suit: The Inter-American Court on
Human Rights
Since both Brazil and Haiti are members of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights ("IAHCR"), it is possible to bring a
suit alleging violations of the American Convention of Human
Rights.0 5 If the Commission finds merit to the Haitian plaintiff's
claim and a settlement with Brazil cannot be mediated, then the
Commission would sue Brazil in the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights.' 6 Countries normally have to consent to IAHCR jurisdiction
in any given case, but Brazil is one of 21 countries that have currently
accepted jurisdiction of the Court in every potential suit as of this
writing (November 2007).17 Individual Haitian plaintiffs may launch
a suit under Article 44 of the Convention."8 MINUSTAH's human
rights violations implicate violations of the right to life (Article 4), the
right to humane treatment (Article 5), the right to personal liberty
(Article 7), the right to property (Article 21), and the right to judicial
protection (Article 25)." Article 25 has also been interpreted by the
IACHR to include a failure to properly investigate serious crimes like
the ones alleged in Haiti.'10
However, the IACHR will refuse to hear a human rights case
regarding Brazil's actions as part of MINUSTAH unless "all remedies
under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance
105. American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter "American Convention"].
106. Id. at arts. 48-51.
107. For a list of countries accepting the jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Commission
on
Human
Rights
see
the
IACHR
website,
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.cfm.
108. American Convention, supra note 101, at art. 44 "Any person or group of
persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member
states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing
denunciations of [sic]complaints in violation of this Convention by a State Party."
109. Id. at arts. 4, 5, 7, 21, 25.
110. See Velasquez v. Peru, Case 11.031, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1129, Report
No.111/00, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. 60 (2000).

20081

Peacekeeping in Name Alone

with generally recognized principles of international law."' .. In fact,
two petitions regarding Brazil's actions in Haiti have both been
declared inadmissible because domestic remedies were not
exhausted.1 2 In the event a plaintiff is deemed to have exhausted his
or her administrative remedies, the benefits of bringing suit in
IACHR are that the Commission could demand that Brazil change
their military contingent's conduct and/or award damages.
It is probably sufficient to attempt suit only in Brazil and Haiti
(without a concurrent claim through the U.N. claims mechanism) in
order to exhaust remedies. On August 4, 2006, the IACHR issued a
brief statement that indicated that evidence against Brazil's
MINUSTAH abuses was inadmissible because "the remedies within
the national legal system have not been exhausted."" The "national
legal system" language implies that remedies need only be sought
against states, not international organizations. Furthcr, due to the
remarkably poor likelihood of a suit being certified to proceed in
Haiti, it is arguable that the futility of bringing suit in Haiti means
that remedies there have already been exhausted. Filing a formal
complaint with the United Nations and thus commencing their
internal claims procedure, explained in detail below, does not seem
necessary in terms of exhausting administrative remedies from a
literal reading of the IACHR's language in their recent petition
dismissals. All exhaustion possibilities must be completed before
launching suit with the IACHR, as that court will not hear a case that
is pending in another legal proceeding."4

111. American Convention, supra note 101, at art. 46.
112. For the two petitions, see Lionel Jean-Baptiste, PetitionersHereby Make an
Urgent Request for ProvisionalMeasures Based on Grave Threats to the Lives of
CiviliansLiving in Port-Au-Prince(Nov. 2005) (denying admissibility against Brazil)
and Jimmy Charles v. Republic ofHaiti,(Jan. 18, 2006) (denying admissibility against
Brazil), available at<http://www.iachr.org/casos.eng.htm>).
113. Letter from Ariel E. Dulitzky, Assistant Executive Sec'y, Org. of American
States, Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights, to the Inst. for Justice and
Democracy in Haiti (Aug. 4, 2006).
114. American Convention, supra note 101, at art. 46(c). See also DINAH
SHELTON. REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Oxford University
Press, 2d ed. 2005).
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E. Other Venues: Legal OptionsAgainst the U.N. Directly
J UN Liabilityin a ThirdPartyCourt
The United Nations may be directly liable for the actions of its
peacekeepers, but the problem of finding an appropriate venue that
will hear the case makes an attempted suit an exercise in frustration.
To illustrate the difficulty of this option, this section will explore an
attempted suit against the Brazilian MINUSTAH commander under
the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") in a United States federal court.'
Human rights violations committed abroad have been previously
considered violations of American law under the ATS, and such a
statute could theoretically be used here against the Brazilian
commander."6
The United Nations maintains complete jurisdictional immunity
under the 1946 Convention of Treaties and Immunities for the United
Nations. 7 Senior U.N. officials, such as the Secretary General or
Security Counsel Representatives, have absolute immunity under the
Convention.11 Lower U.N. officials, as the MINUSTAH commander
arguably qualifies, are only immune from liability if they are acting in
their official capacity (i.e., functional immunity)."9'
Since the
Brazilian military commander is formally appointed by the Secretary
General (currently Major-General Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz),
he can be considered a U.N. official, or, in other words, an agent of
the United Nations. The U.N. commander is functionally immune
from most suits in the United States, and there is no exception
recognized for human rights abuses. Functional immunity has been
defined by the United Nations as being inapplicable for certain
serious criminal acts, since they are clearly outside official functions.2
115. Alien Tort Statute, supra note 79.
116. The Alien Tort Statute was first used in this way in Filartigav. Pena-Irala,630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
117. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13,
1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15. The convention was ratified by the United States
in 1970.
118. Id. at art. V, §19. This note assumes that U.N. officials have the same
immunity as "diplomatic envoys." For an example of the kind of immunity a
diplomat customarily receives, see The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
art. 31, Apr. 24, 1964, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
119. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supra
note 112, at art. V, §18
120. As an example, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights describes how
immunity was declared inapplicable by the U.N. during a rape case involving the
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Even if the United Nations refuses to disavow the commander's
functional immunity, the Restatement [Third] of Foreign Relations
Law states that diplomatic agents, even in their official duties, "are
subject to tort, criminal, and property law generally, although the law
cannot be enforced by legal process. '' 121 This confusing language
suggests there may be liability but no means for a remedy.
A more realistic option than asking the United Nations to
expressly waive its immunity and allow suit against its agent is to wait
for the U.N. official's immunity to terminate. Though immunity
never terminates with respect to the agent's official actions, after an
official ceases to be a U.N. official (for example, when the
commander's time with MINUSTAH is concluded) he may become
liable for violations of laws where personal jurisdiction can be found.
So, the argument would be that while the MINUSTAH commander
cannot be held liable for officially authorizing the February 2007 raid
in Cite Soleil, he could be held liable if the sheer volume of similar
raids and civilian casualties could establish gross recklessness, which
would clearly be outside the scope of official duties. Even if the
commander's gross negligence could be established, the US Supreme
court recently discussed how this evidence is insufficient to create
ATS liability. 22 If the court does not accept the recklessness
argument and finds that the MINUSTAH commander's actions were
within the scope of his official duties, then functional immunity
precludes suit. Furthermore, the commander is a Brazilian official
protected by sovereign immunity; this is an additional hurdle that
must be cleared to bring this kind of suit.
For this suit to commence, a former U.N. peacekeeping
commander would have to avail himself of United States jurisdiction
for any civil action to commence. As for a criminal action, the types
of abuses MINUSTAH troops have engaged in could be considered
in the aggregate as rising to the level of international crimes
warranting universal jurisdiction. However, universal jurisdiction is

U.N. in East Timor. See Hampson, supra note 83, at T 31
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 464 cmt. c (1987).
Incidentally, officials of an international organization are not the same as diplomatic
agents, but the Restatement intended for them to have the same general immunity.
See id. at § 470 cmt. b.
122. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 702 (2003) (negligent behavior by
state actors is so easy to allege that it should be met with skepticism in any FTCA
claim). Due to the failure of Respondent's FTCA claim, he was not allowed to
recover under the ATS. Id. at 720.
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for individual criminal responsibility and has never been used before
against a U.N. peacekeeper. The concept of universal jurisdiction is
sufficiently controversial that it is unclear if the United States
government would exercise such jurisdiction in the foreseeable future
even for more "typical" human rights abuses involving state actors
and/or military officials."l
Combining all these laws and principles, it seems possible to sue
the individuals responsible for the abuses in Haiti in U.S. court if: i)
they are not senior U.N. officials and ii) they are subject to personal
jurisdiction and iii) if they committed non-official actions, and iv)
either the United Nations expressly waives immunity or both
functional and sovereign immunities have expired/become invalidated
through something like universal jurisdiction. Furthermore, all of this
analysis could also be fruitless if the Brazilian commander does not
have an adequate amount of resources for a judgment. This futile
exercise illuminates the Unsettling reality that U.N. officials can only
be held accountable for human rights abuses when the United
Nations decides to judge against itself.
ii. UN. Liabilityin a Claims Commission
Recent General Assembly law has established the parameters of
U.N. financial liability, but the new laws create no private right of
action for a Haitian plaintiff.
The United Nations created a limited liability resolution in 1998
with very strict damage caps (US $50,000 maximum damages) and a
six month statute of limitations. 24 However, the financial limitations
and time limits are removed in situations where U.N. actors commit
actions of gross negligence or willful misconduct.125 MINUSTAH's
actions could fit under either standard. No method of enforcing these
damages is explained, nor are the words "gross negligence" or "willful
misconduct" defined in the resolution. Should the United Nations be
found directly liable under MINUSTAH, it could then sue Brazil

123. The United States has never authorized universal jurisdiction. However, The
United Kingdom did famously recognize such jurisdiction in ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte (1998) 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L.), [1999] 38 I.L.M. 1302.
124. G.A. Res. 52/247,
8, 9d, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/247 (July 17, 1998).
125. Id
See also The Secretary-General, Reform of the Procedures for
Determining Reimbursement to Member States for Contingent-OwnedEquipment,
Annex B(6) 20, delivered to the Security Council and the GeneralAssembly, U.N.
Doc. A/50/995, (July 9, 1996).
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directly for reimbursement under the resolution.1 26 As discussed
earlier, the SOFA dictates that a standing claims commission will be
created to hear any Haitian plaintiff's private law claims.12 ' These
standing claims commission clauses are contained in all recent
peacekeeping operations, but no standing commission has ever been
created. The current approach for settling claims against the United
Nations is by using U.N. claims review boards 1 2
In order to prompt the creation of a U.N. claims review board a
victim must make a formal complaint that notifies the Head of the
Mission of the alleged abuse.12 ' After the investigatory phase, the
United Nations has to decide that the acts are sufficiently serious to
warrant the creation of a formal Board of Inquiry ("BoI").130 The
Bol's deliberations are confidential, but at their conclusion they tell
the victim of any action to be taken by the organization."' This
structure means that the victim has no opportunity to plead her case
and their remedy is completely at the discretion of the Bol. Having
the United Nations decide when it has to pay for its own human rights
abuses is hardly ideal for creating accountability, but it is an available
option to Haitian human rights victims.
Although the claims review boards are not transparent, there are
some existing guidelines that a review board would logically look to
when determining U.N. liability for a peacekeeping operation. The
Department of Peacekeeping Operations states that the United
Nations cannot be liable for "the necessary actions taken by a
peacekeeping force in the course of carrying out its operations in
pursuance of its mandate. 13 2 The Secretary General has outlined
four factors to be considered in evaluating operational necessity: (1)
the force commander needs a "good faith conviction" that
"operational necessity exists," (2) the measure itself is "strictly
126. ld.at art. 9.
127. SOFA, supra note 68 at 55.
128. Daphna Shraga, U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of
International Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related
Damage,94 AM. J. INT'L L. 406, 409 (2000).
129. Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Military Members of National
Contingents, 9, U.N. Doc. DPKOMD/03/00993.
130. Id. at 15.
131. Id. at T 26.
132. The Secretary-General, Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the
Financingof the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:Financingof the United
Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 13, delivered to the Security Council and the
GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A151/389 (Sept. 20, 1996).
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necessary" and not just "a matter of mere convenience or
expediency," (3) the act is part of an overarching "operational plan
and not the result of a rash individual action," and (4) the damage
inflicted will be "proportional to what is strictly necessary to achieve
the operational goal."'33 If the claims review board were to review
MINUSTAH's actions based on these factors, it would likely
determine those actions do not meet factors (2) or (4), and arguably
do not meet factor (1). For example, the massive amount of force
used to capture a single allegedgang member in July, 2005 (See Part
II) is a shocking example of the sheer scale of an attack that was
neither strictly necessary nor proportional to the goal and, therefore,
in violation of the Secretary General's second and fourth factors.
Additionally, the horrific attacks in Cite Soleil and other places were
not strictly necessary and were vastly out of proportion to what
legitimate goals, if any, were being pursued. The MINUSTAH
commanders may have had a good faith belief that all their
operations were necessary, but the unacceptably high number of
civilian casualties should have led to more careful tactics in
subsequent operations, especially in the context of a peacekeeping
mission.
F Applying the Law to the Facts in Haiti
Each of the legal options listed above has its own set of
drawbacks. Suit within Brazil is the only option expressly mandated
by SOFA, so there is no doubt that this option at least exists. But
Brazil would be a foreign and possibly hostile forum for Haitian
victims of MINUSTAH abuses. The IACHR's status as a regional
court would be an easier and more neutral forum than Brazil, but the
Court will not hear a suit until it is satisfied that all domestic remedies
are exhausted. Suing the United Nations for MINUSTAH's human
rights abuses would create the best precedent for creating incentives
for the United Nations to go to greater lengths to ensure future
peacekeeping operations follow recognized principles of human
rights. However, there is a mountain of jurisdictional obstacles to
suing the United Nations directly, and there is no established
precedent via this route. Pushing for the creation of a U.N. claims
review board seems a more likely way to obtain a direct U.N. remedy,
but by choosing this path the organization gets to determine its own

133. Id. at

14.
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responsibility for the alleged abuses in Haiti.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendations
To operate under its professed ideals, the United Nations must
allow for more accountability for the actions of U.N. peacekeepers.
The current structure makes it too difficult to force the United
Nations or troop contributing countries to be held responsible for
their human rights abuses. There are genuine worries that an
overzealous accountability regime would discourage countries from
contributing troops to future peacekeeping missions. Such concerns,
however, should be balanced with the concerns for the horrific abuses
that innocent Haitian civilians have relentlessly endured at the hands
of MINUSTAH. Given these conflicts, some measures should be
implemented to create better peacekeeping accountability:
The United Nations should create the standing claims
commissions mandated in the model SOFA agreement. The claims
commissions should be structured so as to allow actions by non-state
actors and should be created in the host state of a peacekeeping
mission whenever possible.
The claims commission should be
independent with arbitrators elected by both parties. As an example
of how this can be done, each side could elect an arbitrator and jointly
agree on a third.
The United Nations should be allowed to seek reimbursement
from the troop-contributing country for any successful claims brought
for human rights abuses. As such, all troop contributing countries
must sign a "consent to reimburse" agreement before they may be
allowed to contribute troops for U.N. peacekeeping.
An independent investigative body should be created to monitor
each individual peacekeeping operation. Any reported human rights
abuses must be investigated by this body. This body would operate
similarly to the recently discharged ombudsperson in Kosovo, but this
principle should be extended to all peacekeeping missions.
The claims commission judgment should not be a complete bar
to suing within an existing legal system. A revamped U.N. claims
commission's judgment should be relevant when another court is
considering an additional remedy, and the second suit should still be
allowed where there would otherwise be a denial of justice. This
protects against any imperfections that may exist in the standing
claims commission and ensures that both the United Nations and a
specific state actor can be concurrently liable and responsible for
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human rights abuses.
These recommendations are designed to shift responsibility from
the troop-contributing country (where the United Nations cannot
demand compliance) to the organization itself (where they can).
Such measures would perhaps lead to more careful negotiations
before peacekeeping missions are launched, but is that such a bad
thing? Peacekeeping operations have expanded dramatically over the
last decade and, as a result, there is heightened potential for human
rights abuses. Peacekeeping accountability must be in place before a
single blue helmet arrives in places like Haiti. These accountability
measures are necessary both to deter future horrors and to give
justice for the volume of past ones: At 500 a.m. on July 6, 2005,
Edeline PierreLouis, thirty andmother of five, was shot at Bois Neuf
in her house. She suffered bullet wounds in her left arm and in her
belly. At seven months pregnant,Edehne lost her baby.

